Evaluating the Safety Cultures of Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Maintenance Crews by Ammar, Ashtarout et al.
Report Number: KTC-21-25/SPR20-582-1F
DOI: https://doi.org/10.13023/ktc.rr.2021.25
Evaluating the Safety Cultures of
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet Maintenance Crews
The Kentucky Transportation Center is committed to a policy of providing equal 
opportunities for al persons in recruitment, appointment, promotion, payment, training, 
and other employment and education practices without regard for economic, or social 
status and will not discriminate on the basis of race, color, ethnic origin, national origin, 
creed, religion, political belief, sex, sexual orientation, marital status or age.
Kentucky Transportation Center 




Kentucky Transportation Center 




© 2021 University of Kentucky, Kentucky Transportation Center 
Information may no tbe used, reproduced, or republished without KTC’s written consent.
Kentucky Transportation Center • University of Kentucky
176 Raymond Building • Lexington, KY 40506 • 859.257.6898 • www.ktc.uky.edu
18© 2018 University of Kentucky, Kentucky Transportation Center
Information may not be used, reproduced, or republished without KTC’s written consent.
Kentucky Transportatio  Center • University of Kentucky  
176 Raymond Building • Lexington KY 40506 • 859.257.6898 • www.ktc.uky.edu
KentuckyKENTUCKYTransporation Center
Kentucky Transportation Center




The Kentucky Transportation Center is committed to a policy of providing equal 
opportunities for all persons in recruitment, appointment, promotion, payment, training, 
and other employment and education practices without regard for economic or social 
status and will not discriminate on the basis of race, color, ethnic origin, national origin, 
creed, religion, political belief, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, or age.
 2018 niversity of Kentucky, Kentucky Transportation enter
Infor ation ay not be used, reproduced, or republished ithout KT ’s rit en consent.
Kentucky Transportatio  enter • niversity of Kentucky 
176 Ray ond Building • Lexington KY 40506 • 859.257.6898 • .ktc.uky.edu
tTransporation Center
t c y r s rt ti  t r
l  f i ri , iv rsity f t c y L xi t , t c y
i  c r ti  it
t c y r s rt ti  i t
lt  f t c y
 t  r s rt ti  t r is itt  t   li  f r i i  l 
rt iti s f r ll rs s i  r r it t, i t t, r ti , t, tr i i , 
 t r l t  ti  r ti s it t r r  f r i  r s i l 
st t s  ill t is ri i t   t  sis f r , l r, t i  ri i , ti l ri i , 









Zamaan Al-Shabbani, Ph.D 
Research Engineer 
 
Hala Nassereddine, Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor 
 





Gabriel B. Dadi, Ph.D., P.E. 
Program Manager and Associate Professor 
 
 
Kentucky Transportation Center 
College of Engineering 




In Cooperation With 
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet 











The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the data presented herein. The contents do not necessarily reflect 
the official views or policies of the University of Kentucky, the Kentucky Transportation Center, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, the United States Department of 
Transportation, or the Federal Highway Administration. This report does not constitute a standard, specification, or regulation. The inclusion of manufacturer names or trade 





2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient’s Catalog No
4. Title and Subtitle
Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews
5. Report Date
August 2021
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Author(s):
Ashtarout Ammar, Zamaan Al-Shabbani,  Hala Nasssereddine, Chris Van
Dyke, Gabriel B. Dadi
8. Performing Organization Report No.
KTC-21-25/SPR20-582-1F





10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS)
11. Contract or Grant No.
SPR 20-582




13. Type of Report and Period Covered
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplementary Notes
Prepared in cooperation with the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
16. Abstract
Highway work zones can be dangerous and unpredictable. Between 2003 and 2017, over 1,800 workers died on road
construction sites. Eliminating injuries and deaths requires state transportation agencies to adopt robust safety cultures
as there is a clear relationship between these cultures and worker behaviors. The Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
(KYTC) is committed to improving safety performance by nurturing a positive safety climate among highway maintenance 
crews. To understand the safety cultures of KYTC maintenance crews, researchers administered a survey based on the
Safety Climate Assessment Tool (S-CAT) developed by the Center for Construction Research and Training (CPWR). This is
the first tool developed for the construction industry. The survey was used to quantified the existing safety climate and
evaluate how effective safety programs and controls are at reducing workplace hazards. Survey respondents answered
questions on 37 indicators across eight safety climate categories: employee risk perception, management commitment,
aligning and integrating safety as a value, ensuring accountability at all levels, improving supervisory leadership,
empowering and involving employees, improving communication, and safety training. For each indicator respondents
assigned a rating on a five-point Likert scale — Inattentive (1), Reactive (2), Compliant (3), Proactive (4), Exemplary (5).
Analysis of survey responses at the statewide and district levels found that KYTC’s safety culture can be characterized as
between compliant and proactive. Focus groups with maintenance superintendents generated recommendations to
improve safety cultures and install multiple layers of preventive measures to further reduce the number and threat of
jobsite hazards.
17. Key Words
safety climate, highway maintenance, S-CAT, workplace hazards
18. Distribution Statement
Unlimited with approval of the
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet
19. Security Classification (report)
Unclassified
20. Security Classification (this
page)
Unclassified






KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 1 Introduction and Scope of Work ................................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ 3 
1.2 Problem Statement ............................................................................................................................................. 3 
1.3 Objectives ........................................................................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 2 Literature Review .......................................................................................................................................... 5 
2.1 Safety Climate and Safety Culture Definition ..................................................................................................... 5 
2.2 Safety Climate and Safety Culture in the Construction Industry ........................................................................ 6 
2.3 Indicative factors of Safety Climate and Safety Culture in the Construction Industry Context .......................... 6 
Chapter 3 Methodology ................................................................................................................................................. 8 
Chapter 4 S-CAT Survey Results ................................................................................................................................... 10 
4.1 Risk Perceptions Among Employees ................................................................................................................. 11 
4.2 KYTC Management Commitment to Safety ...................................................................................................... 15 
4.3 Aligning and Integrating Safety as a Value ........................................................................................................ 19 
4.4 Ensuring Accountability at All Levels ................................................................................................................ 22 
4.5 Improving Supervisory Leadership .................................................................................................................... 25 
4.6 Empowering and Involving Employees ............................................................................................................. 27 
4.7 Improving Communication ............................................................................................................................... 29 
4.8 Training at All Levels ......................................................................................................................................... 31 
Chapter 5 Safety Culture Assessment Focus Groups ................................................................................................... 36 
5.1 Safety Controls .................................................................................................................................................. 36 
5.2 Routines ............................................................................................................................................................ 36 
5.3 Rituals ............................................................................................................................................................... 37 
5.4 Stories ............................................................................................................................................................... 37 
5.5 Symbols ............................................................................................................................................................. 37 
5.6 Power ................................................................................................................................................................ 37 
5.7 Safety Structures ............................................................................................................................................... 38 
5.8 Underlying Assumptions ................................................................................................................................... 38 
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations ............................................................................................................. 39 
References ................................................................................................................................................................... 41 




KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 
List of Figures 
Figure 3.1 S-CAT Example — Demonstrating Management Commitment .................................................................... 9 
Figure 4.1 Example of S-CAT Indicator Data Summary Table ...................................................................................... 10 




List of Tables 
Table 3.1 KYTC S-CAT Safety Climate Categories and Indicators ................................................................................... 8 
Table 4.1 Statewide Mean Scores for Safety Climate Categories ................................................................................ 34 
Table 4.2 Mean Safety Climate Scores By District ....................................................................................................... 35 




KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 1 
Executive Summary 
 
Jobsites in the highway construction industry are hazardous and unpredictable. Over 1,800 workers died on road 
construction sites between 2003 and 2017, with thousands of other workers suffering injuries. To eliminate injuries 
and deaths, it is important for state departments of transportation and other agencies to embrace robust safety 
cultures. But what constitutes a good safety culture is often unclear — and even more difficult to measure. Highway 
agencies have traditionally used metrics like the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s (OSHA) Total 
Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) to track safety performance. However, metrics such as these are reactive and do 
not necessarily generate information agencies can use to proactively improve safety cultures. Being proactive is 
critical because of the reciprocal relationship between safety culture and worker behavior. A sound safety culture 
fosters safe, consistent, and predictable worker behaviors; these behaviors in turn help to reinforce the safety 
culture. Conversely, a weak safety culture promotes inconsistent and ad hoc behaviors. Wanting to improve its safety 
culture, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) commissioned this study to document the safety cultures of its 
maintenance crews. 
 
To understand the safety cultures of KYTC maintenance crews, Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) researchers 
administered a survey based on the Safety Climate Assessment Tool (S-CAT). This safety assessment tool is the first 
to be developed explicitly for the construction industry. The survey asked respondents to rate the Cabinet’s safety 
performance on 37 indicators across eight safety climate categories: Employee Risk Perception, Demonstrating 
Management Commitment, Aligning and Integrating Safety as a Value, Ensuring Accountability at All Levels, 
Improving Supervisory Leadership, Empowering and Involving Employees, Improving Communication, and Training 
at All Levels. For each indicator respondents assigned a rating on a five-point Likert scale — Inattentive (1), Reactive 
(2), Compliant (3), Proactive (4), Exemplary (5). The scale for Employee Risk Perception was modified slightly and 
measured perceptions in terms of level of satisfaction. The survey was distributed via Qualtrics to all KYTC 
maintenance Superintendents I and Superintendents II. Prospective respondents were told that survey responses 
would remain anonymous. The survey generated 143 responses from staff across the Cabinet’s 12 districts.  
 
Table E1 provides mean scores at the state level for seven climate safety categories (because Employee Risk 
Perception adopted a different measurement scale, the average score does not accurately convey performance). 
The range in scores is narrow (3.47 – 4.21) and it highlights that respondents view KYTC’s safety performance as 
compliant to proactive across all categories. Aligning and Integrating Safety and Improving Supervisory Leadership 
are the categories in which the Cabinet garners the highest scores. District-level averages for all categories were 
calculated as well. The scoring range shows good agreement with statewide data as mean scores fall between 3.47 
and 4.22. Again, this indicates that district safety performance typically rates between compliant and proactive.  
 
Table E1 Statewide Mean Scores for Climate Safety Categories 
Category Mean Category Score 
Aligning and Integrating Safety 4.21 
Improving Supervisory Leadership 4.02 
Improving Communication 3.81 
Demonstrating Management Commitment 3.69 
Empowering and Involving Employees 3.57 
Training at All Levels 3.53 
Accountability at All Levels 3.47 
 
After survey data were analyzed, KTC researchers convened focus groups with maintenance superintendents in two 
districts for in-depth evaluations of the Cabinet’s safety culture. Focus group participants discussed eight elements 
of organizational life: Safety Controls, Routines, Rituals, Stories, Symbols, Power, Safety Structures, and Underlying 
Assumptions. Participants observed that KYTC will benefit from adopting formal incentives to recognize crews for 
positive safety performances. Routines — in the form of weekly safety meetings, job hazard analyses, and toolbox 
talks — are thoroughly integrated into Cabinet practices, while rituals are less common and generally reserved for 
trainings attended by new staff during their first year of employment. Participants agreed that stories are a powerful 
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way to communicate with personnel about potential jobsite hazards and preventive actions that can be taken to 
reduce the likelihood of injuries. However, communication with drivers approaching work zones could be improved. 
Importantly, KYTC staff feel empowered to assess jobsites and, if conditions are deemed unsafe, discontinue work 
until the hazard passes or can be mitigated. Indeed, one of the key underlying assumptions that guides decision 
making is that it is imperative to operate safely so all workers return home at the end of the day. Moving forward, 
KYTC can continue to build a strong safety culture by enacting multiple precautionary measures (or multiple layers 
of defense) to prevent accidents from happening.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction and Scope of Work 
 
1.1 Introduction 
Working environments in the construction industry are inherently volatile. In 2019, 1,061 fatal injuries were reported 
on construction sites, an increase of 5% over 2018 and the highest tally since 2007 (Slowey 2020). Many strategies 
have been adopted to lower fatal injury rates and improve occupational safety and health. These include prevention 
through design, improved engineering controls, new regulations, and enhanced personal protective equipment 
(PPE) (Probst et al. 2019). Safety in the road construction sector largely mirrors industrywide trends. Work zones are 
extremely hazardous for drivers and the workers who build, repair, and maintain highways. Between 2003 and 2017, 
1,844 workers died on road construction sites — an average of 123 deaths per year (NIOSH 2019). However, the 
amount of research focused on the safety and health of highway maintenance workers has been limited. 
 
Traditionally, safety performance has been tracked using metrics such as the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR), which is calculated using the following equation: 
 
Total Numbe of Recordable Cases ×  200,000
Total Hours Worked By Employees During the Year Covered 
 
 
Other metrics include injuries that require more than basic first aid, days absent following an injury, and days of 
restricted work following an injury. Longitudinal analysis of these measures is used to detect trends in safety 
performance. These measures can also provide good insights into the history of safety performance, however, they 
are reactive in that they reflect failures of safety systems rather than proactively flagging indicators of failures before 
they occur. This has prompted researchers to investigate new proactive safety measures (Probst et al. 2019). But 
currently state departments of transportation (DOTs) largely continue to rely on traditional safety performance 
measures.  
 
Most researchers agree that safety climate is a leading indicator of safety performance and that it can positively 
influence a worker’s safety knowledge, motivation, perceptions, and attitudes (Clarke 2010; Zohar 2010). To develop 
predictive relationships between safety climate and safety performance, researchers have investigated how the two 
are correlated. For example, researchers have found a negative correlation between safety climate and injury rates 
(Lingard et al. 2012; Chen et al. 2013; McCabe et al. 2017). Several meta-analyses of safety climate showed that 
safety climate can predict workplace incidents as well as under-reported safety incidents, near misses, safety 
knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety-related organizational behaviors (Clarke 2010; 
Nahrgang et al. 2011; Jiang et al. 2019). Given that safety climate is related to worker safety behaviors and linked to 
safety performance, organizations must routinely measure and assess safety performance to continually improve 
the safety climate and establish a positive safety culture.  
 
On jobsites DOT highway maintenance employees are exposed to hazards and extreme working conditions (e.g.,  
working adjacent to high-speed traffic, exposure to heavy equipment that transports large quantities of materials 
(Al-Shabbani et al., 2018). Agencies use predictive safety measures to improve and track safety performance, assess 
their safety climates, and enhance occupational safety and health. Wanting to continue strengthening its safety 
climate and culture, the Kentucky Transportation Cabinet (KYTC) asked Kentucky Transportation Center (KTC) 
researchers to investigate several safety approaches (Al-Shabbani et al. 2018, Al-Shabbani et al. 2021) and evaluate 
and measure the safety climate among KYTC highway maintenance crews. Our team used modified version of the 
Safety Climate Assessment Tool (S-CAT) tool to carry out this evaluation. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Safety culture refers to how employees integrate safety into occupational practices, especially when nobody is 
watching. At an organizational level, it is defined by shared values and beliefs and — when coupled with safety 
control systems — establishes behavioral norms. Regardless of the number and effectiveness of an organization’s 
engineering and administrative safety controls, behavior and attitudes toward safety depend on safety culture. A 
safety climate is a measure of the perceived value placed on safety in an organization. It is a fluid snapshot of safety 
that can change relatively quickly. Because a culture embodies an organization’s shared values it takes much longer 
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to change. Investing in safety climate and culture has recently become a focus of researchers and practitioners in 
the construction industry due to the increasing evidence that improving safety performance saves money. KYTC has 
focused of late on improving safety performance, especially among highway maintenance employees. To appraise 
how effective this effort has been, a safety culture assessment was needed.  
 
1.3 Objectives 
This study’s primary objective was to evaluate and map KYTC’s existing safety culture among maintenance crews 
and propose guidance to improve the safety culture. Analyses and ideas presented in this report will help KYTC 
understand the current status of different safety climate indicators and support decision making related to the 
agency’s safety culture. Secondary project objectives included: 
 
1. Identifying leading safety factors and indicators that apply to KYTC and can help measure the safety climate. 
2. Measuring and assessing the current status of the safety climate of KYTC maintenance crews. 
3. Conducting a cultural assessment to assess employee perceptions of the organizational culture. 
4. Preparing recommendations to achieve continuous improvement in safety climate and overall safety culture. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
When researchers first turned their attention to workplace safety, they generally focused on individual safety 
performance indicators, work injuries, and accidents. As the 1990s came to a close safety researchers began paying 
attention to how a number of factors influence safety, including teams, leadership, and organizational roles 
(Hofmann et al., 2017). New safety models emerged and the investigation of applied psychology by federal agencies, 
such as OSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), assumed greater stature 
(Colligan and Cohen 2004). New work on safety climates represented a milestone because it confirmed the  
importance of a broader organizational safety concept (Hofmann et al., 2017). Among researchers, there is a 
consensus on the value of safety culture and safety climate in improving safety and preventing injuries (e.g., Lingard 
et al. 2013;  Hofmann et al. 2017).  
 
Because working environments in the construction industry are unpredictable, it is critical to examine what factors 
support a positive safety climate and an improved overall safety culture. But defining and measuring safety climate 
and safety culture remains contested (Zohar and Hofman 2014). Zohar and Hofman (2014) identified 54 different 
definitions of safety culture in the research literature. For the construction industry, safety culture and climate have 
not been well defined, with work often ignoring jobsite characteristics (Al-Bayati et al., 2019). The following sections 
discuss key definitions of safety climate and safety culture, focusing on those most salient to the construction 
industry.  
 
2.1 Safety Climate and Safety Culture Definition  
Zohar (1980) was the first to define safety climate and develop and test the validity of a measurement scale. He 
described safety climate as “shared employee perceptions about the relative importance of safe conduct in their 
occupational behavior.” Perceptions of safety climate are reinforced when employees share their experiences and 
opinions related to the level at which management cares and invests in their safety and health (Hofmann et al. 2017). 
Several agencies have also proposed definitions of safety climate, including the National Construction Agenda (NCA) 
and the Center for Construction Research and Training (CPWR). NCA defines safety climate as shared employee 
perceptions and attitudes about safety at a workplace (NCA 2018). CPWR sees it as a leading indicator that reflects 
the extent to which a safety program is integrated into an organization to ensure safe practices. Safety climate 
represents the shared perceptions and the degree to which safety is emphasized relative to competing 
organizational priorities (Gillen et al., 2014). The NCA definition highlights norms, values, and commitments from an 
organization, while CPWR focuses on an organization’s implicit safety perceptions. OSHA and the US Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) have not defined safety climate (Al-Bayati et al. 2019).  
 
Besides the ambiguity in definitions of safety climate, current approaches to measurement do not clearly distinguish 
between safety climate and safety culture (Al-Bayati et al. 2019). Some researchers contend that safety climate is a 
subcomponent of safety culture (Cooper 2000). Others regard safety climate as a snapshot of safety culture for a 
specific period (Cooper and Phillips 2004). A few researchers have argued that safety culture is an antecedent of 
safety culture  (Martínez-Córcoles et al. 2011).  
 
The concept of safety culture first surfaced in a 1986 report investigating the Chernobyl disaster — a poor safety 
culture was blamed for the catastrophe (Huang et al. 2010). OSHA defines safety culture as the shared beliefs, 
practices, and attitudes within an organization. Culture is the atmosphere fostered by these beliefs, attitudes, and 
perceptions, which shapes behavior (OSHA 2000). The NCA views safety culture as the underlying organizational 
principles, norms, commitments, and values related to how safety and health are operationalized and the result of 
the relative importance accorded to safety and health relative to other workplace goals (NCA 2018). CPWR defines 
safety culture as unspoken safety-related beliefs interacting with an organization’s systems, practices, people, and 
leadership to set the foundation for how things are done in an organization. In general, safety culture is a subset of 
and directly influenced by organizational culture (Gillen et al. 2014). NRC interprets safety culture as the core values 
and behaviors resulting from a collective commitment of leaders and individuals to safety over competing goals to 
protect people and the environment (NRC 2018). In general, researchers propose that a nonformal relationship 
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exists between safety culture and safety climate, where safety culture affects safety climate levels (Al-Bayati et al. 
2019).    
 
2.2 Safety Climate and Safety Culture in the Construction Industry  
The construction industry is distinctive because it yokes together businesses of varying sizes and disciplines. This 
results in a broad spectrum of relationships between workers and employers and a range of long-term and short-
term employment arrangements with a single employer or multiple employers that last for days, months, or years 
(NCA 2018). However, this variability may harm the construction industry’s safety climate (Schwatka et al. 2016).  
 
In a comprehensive literature review of safety climates in the construction industry, Schwatka et al. (2016)  identified 
56 research publications authored since 2008. Most researchers evaluating safety climates adopted surveys 
developed for other sectors, with the most common options being  the United Kingdom Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) safety climate questionnaire and the Climate Survey Tool (CST) (HSE 1997). Others have adopted a safety 
climate survey from Zohar (2000) developed for manufacturing companies, a scale proposed by Nael et al. (2000), 
and the NIOSH tool for health care workers (Dejoy et al. 1995). Geller’s (1990) general safety climate assessment 
tool and Burt et al.’s (1998) scale have  been tested with workers from a variety of occupations. 
 
Jiang et al. (2019) found that using industry-specific measures of safety climate generates better predictions of 
employee safety behaviors and attitudes than generalized measurement tools. Few researchers have developed 
industry-specific surveys. Some examples include Dedobbeleer and Béland (1991), who validated their study in the 
US construction industry; Mohamed (2002), who developed and tested a tool in the Australian construction industry; 
and Kines et al. (2011), who designed and tested a tool in the construction industry across five Nordic countries. 
However, the survey tools used most often fail to capture the construction industry’s true nature, where 
management usually oversees multiple projects at various construction sites. In such cases, management indirectly 
affects safety climate levels while frontline supervisors and workers play a crucial role in determining the safety 
practices in the field (Al-Bayati et al., 2019).  
 
2.3 Indicative factors of Safety Climate and Safety Culture in the Construction Industry Context  
Several researchers have tried to define what makes for a good survey of safety culture and safety climate in the 
construction environment (e.g., Esmaeili and Hallowell 2012; Alruqi et al. 2018; Al-Bayati et al. 2019).  
 
Alruqi et al. (2018) reviewed surveys that measure construction safety climate dimensions, identified critical 
dimensions of safety climate, generated a consistent definition of each safety climate dimension, and assessed to 
what extent safety climate dimensions can predict construction safety performance. They described safety climate 
dimensions that are common across all studies:  
 
1) Management commitment to safety dictates how effective top management is at ensuring safety is an 
organizational priority.  
2) Safety responses among supervisors illustrate how first-line leaders implement organizational safety 
procedures during daily activities.  
3) Safety rules and procedures estimate to what extent workers believe and follow their organization’s safety 
rules and procedures to prevent accidents and injuries.  
4) Communication refers to how top management is communicating with employees regarding occupational 
safety and health and whether they are receptive to worker concerns about safety and health.  
5) Worker involvement describes the degree to which upper management encourages worker participation in 
the organization’s safety establishment, (e.g. creating safety policies).  
6) Training refers to how well workers are educated and instructed about occupational safety and health.  
7) Risk-taking behavior is the amount of risk that workers might take to get the job done even if doing so could 
violate safety rules and regulations.  
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Al-Bayati et al. (2019) reviewed work on identified 12 key safety climate indicators that upper management, safety 
personnel, frontline supervisors, and workers are responsible for implementing and which are highly important 
injury prevention techniques. They include:  
 
• Emergency response planning  
• Frequent worksite inspection  
• Safety and health orientation and training  
• JHA 
• Upper management support  
• Employee involvement and evaluation  
• Subcontractor selection and management  
• Safety manager onsite  
• Substance abuse programs  
• Safety and health committees  
• Project-specific training and meetings  
• Recordkeeping and accident analysis  
 
Researchers factored into the assessment the issue of upper management and safety personnel challenges related 
to managing projects in multiple locations by generating rules and allocating resources.  
 
CPWR developed the Safety Climate Assessment Tool (S-CAT) to help management and safety professionals collect 
data on leading indicators of safety climate so that good practices can be reinforced, boosting jobsite safety climate 
and safety outcomes for the construction industry (CPWR 2018). It is the first rubric-based safety climate measure 
designed for the construction industry. Any construction organization can adapt the S-CAT to assess safety climate. 
Companies can receive feedback on their organization’s score for each safety climate factor and how their scores 
compare to industry benchmark scores in the S-CAT database. Moreover, companies can receive guidance and 
information on how to improve each area. Scores can be used to track and assess safety-related interferences 
implemented by an organization over time since they are adopting a uniform way to evaluate the safety climate 
(Probst et al., 2019). Probst et al. (2019) validated the S-CAT by evaluating how well S-CAT scores correlate with 
organizational safety outcomes. They tested the hypothesis that S-CAT scores are negatively associated with TRIRs 
by comparing average safety climate scores to TRIRs. They found a significant negative correlation between the 
organizational–level safety climate and the corresponding TRIR. The researchers suggested that the S-CAT be tested 
against other safety measures (e.g., safety management interventions) to evaluate how effectively they improve 
safety outcomes.  
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Chapter 3 Methodology 
 
3.1 S-CAT Survey 
We chose the S-CAT to survey KYTC maintenance personnel on the agency’s safety climate. It is an ideal option 
because construction organizations can adapt the tool to their particular needs. Survey respondents assessed KYTC’s 
safety climate based on 37 indicators across eight categories identified by construction industry subject-matter 
experts. Each category contained between three and seven indicators. For each indicator, respondents provided a 
rating using a five-point Likert scale (Probst et al. 2019). We tailored the S-CAT to the Cabinet’s unique organizational 
structure. Because the category of Encouraging Owner/Client Involvement is not relevant to KYTC, we replaced it 
with another category — Employee Risk Perception. Several researchers have acknowledged that employee risk 
perception is an essential indicator of an organization’s safety climate (Zohar 1980; Chen et al. 2013; Schwatka et al. 
2016). Table 3.1 lists safety climate categories, number of indicators, and the scale respondents used to rate KYTC 
on each indicator. Figure 3.1 illustrates the S-CAT in its original form. Appendix A includes the full  survey, which was 
distributed via Qualtrics to all KYTC maintenance Superintendents I and Superintendents II. Respondents were 
informed at the outset that all of their answers would be anonymous. We received 143 responses from the Cabinet’s 
12 districts. We calculated summary statistics at the district and statewide levels to identify trends and pinpoint 
safety climate categories and indicators that could warrant greater attention from KYTC.   
 
Table 3.1 KYTC S-CAT Safety Climate Categories and Indicators 
Safety Climate Categories Number of Indicators Scale  
1. Employee Risk Perception 7 5 level Likert Scale {Strongly disagree, Disagree, Agree, Neutral, strongly agree} 
2. Demonstrating Management 
Commitment 6 
5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, 
Proactive, Exemplary} 
3. Aligning & Integrating Safety 
as a Value 6 
5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, 
Proactive, Exemplary} 
4. Ensuring Accountability at All 
Levels 4 
5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, 
Proactive, Exemplary} 
5. Improving Supervisory 
Leadership 3 
5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, 
Proactive, Exemplary} 
6. Empowering &Involving 
employees 3 
5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, 
Proactive, Exemplary} 
7. Improving communication 3 5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, Proactive, Exemplary} 
8. Training at All Levels 6 5 level Rubric-Based Scale {Inattentive, Reactive, Compliant, Proactive, Exemplary} 
 
3.2 District Focus Groups 
After evaluating S-CAT responses, we collected additional data on employee perceptions of safety climate through 
focus groups in two Cabinet districts. Material drawn from the Cultural Web Assessment Toolkit provided the basis 
for group discussions. The toolkit was developed by Johnson (1992) to assess employee perceptions of organizational 
culture, but it can also be used to evaluate an organization’s safety culture for purely diagnostic purposes or inform 
the development of an action plan to strategically improve an organization’s safety culture. We adopted a semi-
structured format for focus groups, with participants having the opportunity to speak extemporaneously on a variety 
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Figure 3.1 S-CAT Example — Demonstrating Management Commitment 
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Chapter 4 S-CAT Survey Results 
 
This chapter presents findings from the S-CAT survey. Each section focuses on a safety climate category and its 
respective indicators. The beginning of each section includes a brief narrative that describes key findings at a high 
level and notes for which indicators the range of district mean scores exceeded 1.00. If the range is greater than this 
threshold value, KYTC may want to take a closer look at the indicator to determine why significant inter-district 
variability exists and identify potential steps to mitigate disparities. A series of tables follows each narrative. Each 
table presents summary statistics for an indicator (Figure 4.1). The table heading lists the indicator/question. It does 
not provide the full range of responses survey participants could choose from (see Appendix A). Rather, the heading 
distills the theme of the indicator in a short phrase. Below the indicator are data on the percentage of survey 
respondents who chose each rating — the box for the response which garnered the highest percentage is shaded. 
Underneath this information the table is divided into three columns. The first two columns summarize district-level 
responses. The first column lists the number of survey respondents in each district, and the second gives the district 
mean scores. Because all surveys were anonymous we do not identify the actual districts. The third column provides 
the range of district mean scores. At the bottom of each table is the indicator’s statewide mean score.  
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4.1 Risk Perceptions Among Employees 
Although respondents generally feel that there is a high probability of workers being involved in a job-related 
accident (Q9, mean = 2.22), most do not believe that workers expose themselves to risk to complete activities (Q10, 
mean = 3.47) or that productivity is valued more than safety (Q11, mean = 4.41). A high percentage of respondents 
believe that workers are more likely to be involved in a traffic-related accident than a work-related accident (Q12, 
mean = 2.66). Despite this perception, work-related accidents spark greater concern than traffic-related incidents 
(Q13, mean = 3.48). However, for both of these questions the mean values are not far removed from what would be 
deemed a neutral opinion. Respondents lack a strong opinion on whether injury risks are a natural part of a job in 
highway maintenance (Q14, mean = 3.36). There is a consensus that safety shortcuts are not taken when necessary 
(Q15, mean = 4.27). The range of district-level mean scores exceeds 1.00 on three questions:  
 
• (Q10, range = 1.80) At work we take the risk of getting hurt in order to get the job done. 
• (Q12, range = 1.29) In our work, the probability of being involved in a traffic accident is higher than the 
probability of being involved in a work-related accident. 
• (Q14, range = 1.30) In highway maintenance work, the risk of getting hurt is part of the job. 
 
Despite these ranges, it is unlikely closer scrutiny of inter-district variability is needed as they reflect the propensity 
of respondents in some districts to adopt a more neutral position rather than voicing explicit concerns about safety 
practices.   
 
Q9: In highway maintenance work, there is a high probability that workers are going to be involved in a 
work-related accident. 
Strongly Disagree 
(5) Disagree (4) Neutral (3) Agree (2) Strongly Agree (1) 
3.38% 3.38% 23.03% 50.56% 19.66% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
16 2.50 
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Q10: At work, we take the risk of getting hurt in order to get the job done. 
Strongly Disagree 
(5) Disagree (4) Neutral (3) Agree (2) Strongly Agree (1) 
22.47% 35.58% 16.85% 19.66% 8.43% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.50 












Statewide Mean: 3.47 
 
 
Q11: In our work, productivity is more important and valued than safety. 
Strongly Disagree 
(5) Disagree (4) Neutral (3) Agree (2) Strongly Agree (1) 
54.49% 35.39% 6.74% 1.69% 1.69 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.83 
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Q12: In our work, the probability of being involved in a traffic accident is higher than the probability of being 
involved in a work-related accident. 
Strongly Disagree 
(5) Disagree (4) Neutral (3) Agree (2) Strongly Agree (1) 
2.25% 14.61% 39.89% 37.64% 5.62% 
Number of Respondents  District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
10 3.00 












Statewide Mean: 2.66 
 
 
Q13: In our work, we are more concerned about traffic-related accidents than work-related accidents. 
Strongly Disagree 
(5) Disagree (4) Neutral (3) Agree (2) Strongly Agree (1) 
15.73% 40.45% 29.78% 11.80% 2.24% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
11 3.82 
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Q14: In highway maintenance work, the risk of getting hurt is part of the job. 
Strongly Disagree 
(5) Disagree (4) Neutral (3) Agree (2) Strongly Agree (1) 
17.98% 33.12% 19.66% 23.60% 5.62% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
10 3.80 












Statewide Mean: 3.36 
 
 
Q15: In our work, we take safety shortcuts when necessary. 
Strongly Disagree 
(1) Disagree (2) Neutral (3) Agree (4) Strongly Agree (5) 
45.51% 39.33% 11.80% 2.25% 1.12% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
11 4.55 
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4.2 KYTC Management Commitment to Safety 
Overall, respondents believe that KYTC’s management demonstrates a robust commitment to safety. Mean scores 
for indicators in this category are generally between 3 and 5, with only a small fraction of respondents questioning 
how safety is handled. On the question of management visits to job sites, most respondents grade management as 
proactive or exemplary (Q18, mean = 3.52), but as the range of mean scores shows there is significant inter-district 
variability in respondent attitudes. Management commitment to sound safety practices is rated similarly (Q19, mean 
= 3.62), with a majority of respondents saying that management is proactive or exemplary. Notably, the range for 
this indicator is much narrower than for Q18. Most respondents hold a positive view of the degree to which 
management participates in safety audits(Q20, mean = 3.36) and feel confident about management’s commitment 
to investigating safety incidents and introducing appropriate corrective measures (Q21, mean = 3.77). The 
overwhelming majority of respondents contend that management support for injured employees is proactive or 
exemplary, with this indicator producing the highest mean score in this category (Q22, mean = 4.32). In terms of the 
quality of safety management and reviews, respondents are a little more split in their opinions, however, a large 
proportion ranks management as compliant or better on this metric. The range of district-level mean scores exceeds 
1.00 on four questions: 
 
• (Q18, range = 1.92) Frequency of management visits to jobsites 
• (Q19, range = 1.15) Commitment of management to sound safety practices on job sites  
• (Q20, range = 1.38) Management level of participation in safety audits 
• (Q21, range = 1.09) Management commitment to thoroughly investigating and correcting safety incidents 
 
Of particular note is the spread for Q18, which is nearly 2.00. This level of discrepancy suggests it is an area that 
merits greater scrutiny from district-level management and perhaps Cabinet leadership to ensure parity among 
district offices. 
 
Q18: Frequency of management visits to jobsites 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 12.25% 2.72% 18.37% 25.85% 40.82% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
8 4.62 
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Q19: Commitment of management to sound safety practices on job sites  
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 3.47% 2.79% 21.53% 40.28% 31.94% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
13 4.15 












Statewide Mean: 3.62 
 
 
Q20: Management level of participation in safety audits 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 2.92% 2.92% 24.82% 38.69% 30.66% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
8 4.38 
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Q21: Management commitment to thoroughly investigating and correcting safety incidents 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.37% 1.37% 15.07% 50.00% 32.19% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District  Mean Scores (Spread) 
8 4.38 












Statewide Mean: 3.77 
 
 
Q22: Management level of support for injured employees 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 0.66% — 6.62% 28.48% 64.24% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
8 4.75 
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Q23: Quality of safety management and reviews 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 0.63% 3.80% 21.52% 32.91% 29.75% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores 
14 3.93 
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4.3 Aligning and Integrating Safety as a Value 
Respondents believe that KYTC embraces a culture of safety. Mean scores for all metrics in this category are between 
4 and 5. On four of the five indicators, the highest proportion of respondents rank the Cabinet and management as 
exemplary. Respondents view Cabinet employees as committed to safety (Q25, mean = 4.17) and observe that 
frequent discussions are held focused on safety (Q26, mean = 4.43). Ratings for the Cabinet’s organizational 
commitment to safety (Q27, mean = 4.20), making sure safety considerations are integrated into policies and 
procedures (Q28, mean = 4.19), and implementation of safety measures (Q29, mean = 4.18) are practically identical. 
Respondents also feel that management is invested in safety programs and processes. (Q30, mean = 4.07). The range 
of district-level mean scores exceeds 1.00 on one question: 
 
• (Q28, range = 1.29) Integration of safety considerations into policies and procedures 
 
The lack of inter-district variability demonstrates safety is highly valued statewide at KYTC and that in all districts is 
safety treated as a high priority. 
 
Q25: Employee commitment to safety  
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 3.29% 2.63% 1.97% 43.42% 48.68% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
11 4.55 












Statewide Mean: 4.17 
 
 
Q26: Frequency of discussions focused on safety 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— — 0.67% 6.67% 26.00% 66.67% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
8 4.88 












Statewide Mean: 4.43 
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Q27: Organizational commitment to safety 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 0.67% 0.67% 6.00% 43.33% 49.33% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
14 4.64 












Statewide Mean: 4.20 
 
 
Q28: Integration of safety considerations into policies and procedures 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.35% 2.03% 3.38% 35.81% 57.43% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.67 
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Q29: Focus on implementation of safety measures 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— — 2.72% 6.12% 34.01% 57.14% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.50 












Statewide Mean: 4.18 
 
Q30: Management level of investment in safety programs and processes 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
3.21% 1.92% 1.28% 6.41% 53.21% 33.97% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
20 4.35 
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4.4 Ensuring Accountability at All Levels 
Although respondents generally view KYTC as working to ensure accountability on safety-related matters across the 
organization, mean scores for this group of indicators are little lower than for the previous category — valuing safety. 
Ratings for integration of safety practices into employee performance evaluations (Q32, mean = 3.69) and supervisor 
evaluations (Q33, mean = 3.63) are very similar, on the high side of compliant. Respondents see KYTC as being more 
proactive in terms of identifying safety expectations, roles, and responsibilities (Q34, mean = 3.94). One one area in 
which respondents view the Cabinet as lacking is the availability of incentives for good safety performance (Q35, 
mean = 2.62). For this indicator, the highest proportion of respondents viewed KYTC as being reactive, which 
suggests the agency may want to explore making tangible incentives available to staff. The range of district-level 
mean scores exceeds 1.00 on three questions: 
 
• (Q32, range = 1.40) Integration of safety practices into employee performance evaluations 
• (Q33, range = 1.81) Integration of safety practices into supervisor performance evaluations 
• (Q35, range = 1.67) Availability of incentives for good safety performance 
 
These ranges reflect considerable inter-district variability and argue for further investigating why discrepancies are 
present between districts and what steps can be taken to cultivate a more uniform commitment to accountability.  
 
Q32: Integration of safety practices into employee performance evaluations 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— — 6.67% 14.07% 49.63% 29.63% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.50 
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Q33: Integration of safety practices into supervisor performance evaluations 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 5.30% 1.52% 16.67% 36.36% 40.15% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.67 












Statewide Mean: 3.63 
 
 
Q34: Identification of safety expectations, roles, and responsibilities 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.43% 1.43% 5.71% 61.43% 30.00% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.33 
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Q35: Availability of incentives for good safety performance 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
16.78% 27.89% 0.68% 9.52% 24.49% 21.77% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 3.67 
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4.5 Improving Supervisory Leadership 
Respondents view supervisors as being committed to matters of safety, with mean scores for indicators in this 
category clustered around 4. Supervisors do a good job of clearly communicating their vision for safety (Q37, mean 
= 3.89) and possess a sound working knowledge of regulatory requirements while demonstrating ample leadership 
(Q38, mean = 4.20), with most respondents rating supervisors as exemplary on the latter attributes. Supervisors also 
actively participate in safety activities (Q39, mean = 3.97). The range of district-level mean scores exceeds 1.00 on 
two questions: 
 
• (Q37, range = 1.42) Clarity and communication of visions for safety among supervisors 
• (Q38, range = 1.03) Supervisor leadership abilities and knowledge of regulatory requirements 
 
Given the range of responses for Q37, the Cabinet may benefit from looking at whether supervisors can do a better 
job in some districts to communicate a clear and proactive vision for safety. 
 
Q37: Clarity and communication of visions for safety among supervisors 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 2.14% 0.71% 17.14% 41.43% 38.57% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.67 












Statewide Mean: 3.89 
 
 
Q38: Supervisor leadership abilities and knowledge of regulatory requirements 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 2.16% 5.76% 0.72% 23.74% 67.63% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.83 












Statewide Mean: 4.20 
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Q39: Active participation in safety activities among supervisors 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— — 2.17% 5.80% 54.35% 37.68% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.67 
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4.6 Empowering and Involving Employees 
For each of the indicators related to staff empowerment, mean scores hover around 3.50, or between compliant 
and proactive. Respondents generally have a positive view of their level of empowerment to maintain safety on the 
jobsite, with approximately 58% giving a rating of 4 or 5 (Q41, mean = 3.48). Employees feel like they have the ability 
to offer adequate input on safety-related issues, with a significant majority rating KYTC as proactive or exemplary 
(Q42, mean = 3.67). Safety committees appear to be a mainstay of Cabinet operations, with nearly 70% of 
respondents holding a very positive view of efforts in this area (Q43, mean = 3.57). The range of district-level mean 
scores exceeds 1.00 on two questions. 
 
• (Q42, range = 1.10) Level of employee input on safety-related issues 
• (Q43, range = 1.17) Presence of safety committees 
 
As the ranges for both of these questions is near the threshold, they probably do not warrant significant attention, 
but KYTC can benefit from monitoring performance on these issues to minimize inter-district variability in the future. 
 
Q41: Empowerment of employees to maintain jobsite safety 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
5.59% 4.11% 2.10% 30.14% 40.41% 17.80% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
11 3.82 
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Q42: Level of employee input on safety-related issues 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 3.70% 3.70% 17.04% 42.22% 33.33% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
8 4.50 












Statewide Mean: 3.67 
 
 
Q43: Presence of safety committees 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.56% 7.03% 4.69% 55.47% 31.25% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.17 
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4.7 Improving Communication 
Respondents feel that KYTC performs well on communication-related indicators, although for two of the indicators 
inter-district variability is a concern the agency should attend to. Similar to other employee involvement metrics, 
respondents feel integrated into discussions and decision making focused on safety (Q46, mean = 3.65). Respondents 
generally approve of how the Cabinet goes about collecting injury and illness data, with approximately 70% scoring 
the agency as either proactive or exemplary (Q47, mean = 3.95). The quality and scope of safety-related 
communication also receives high marks, with nearly 80% of respondents holding a very positive view of KYTC’s 
efforts (Q48, mean = 3.83). The range of district-level mean scores exceeds 1.00 on two questions: 
 
• (Q47, range = 1.86) Collection of Injury and Illness data 
• (Q48, range = 1.45) Quality and breadth of safety-related communication efforts 
 
Although both indicators warrant a closer look, this is especially true of data collection given the nearly two-point 
gap between the lowest and highest district mean scores. 
 
 
Q46: Involvement of employees in safety discussions and decision making 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 3.68% 5.15% 8.82% 66.18% 16.18% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
11 3.91 
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Q47: Collection of Injury and Illness data 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.48% 2.22% 17.04% 29.63% 49.63% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.67 












Statewide Mean: 3.95 
 
 
Q48: Quality and breadth of safety-related communication efforts 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— — 3.76% 16.54% 38.35% 41.35% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores 
6 4.83 
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4.8 Training at All Levels 
Except for the availability of safety training (Q50, mean = 4.32), mean scores for indicators are in the compliant-to- 
proactive range, however, the presence of considerable inter-district variability demands reflection. In terms of 
safety trainings, roughly 80% of respondents have a very positive view of their availability. Certification requirements 
has the lowest mean score, with just over half of respondents rating KYTC as compliant (Q51, mean = 3.36). About 
80% of respondents view the availability of leadership-oriented training in a very positive light (Q52, mean = 3.77), 
while a smaller fraction hold the same opinion about the role of employees and supervisors in identifying training 
materials and needs (Q53, mean = 3.55). Respondents harbor generally positive views of the level of rigor involved 
in training verification (Q54, mean = 3.52) and the qualification of trainers (Q55, mean = 3.62). Compared to other 
categories of indicators, higher percentage of respondents put down NA — approaching 10% for several indicators. 
The range of district-level mean scores exceeds 1.00 on all six questions:    
 
• (Q50, range = 1.27) Availability of safety training 
• (Q51, range = 1.85) Certification requirements 
• (Q52, range = 1.33) Availability of training focused on leadership skills 
• (Q53, range = 1.83) Supervisor and employee involvement in identifying training needs/materials 
• (Q54, range = 1.64) Rigor of training verification 
• (Q55, range = 1.59) Qualifications of trainers 
 
There is significant variability in how respondents from district to district rate indicators in this category. For 
example, both certification requirements and staff level of involvement in identifying training needs/materials have 
large spreads — 1.85 and 1.83, respectively. In some districts respondents are content with the roles they play, but 
in others work must be done to improve the situation so the KYTC can achieve statewide consistency. 
 
 
Q50: Availability of safety training 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— — 1.50% 13.53% 45.11% 39.85% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.67 
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Q51: Certification requirements 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 0.78% 1.55% 60.47% 20.16% 17.05% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
11 3.73 












Statewide Mean: 3.36 
 
 
Q52: Availability of training focused on leadership skills 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.54% 1.54% 11.54% 65.38% 20.00% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.33 
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Q53: Supervisor and employee involvement in identifying training needs/materials 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.52% 5.30% 23.49% 49.24% 20.46% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.33 












Statewide Mean: 3.55 
 
 
Q54: Rigor of training verification 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 1.63% 2.44% 25.20% 45.53% 25.20% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores (Spread) 
6 4.33 
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Q55: Qualifications of trainers 
NA Inattentive (1) Reactive (2) Compliant (3) Proactive (4) Exemplary (5) 
— 0.78% 10.08% 17.05% 41.09% 31.01% 
Number of Respondents District Mean Score Range of District Mean Scores 
6 4.67 












Statewide Mean: 3.62 
 
4.9 Safety Climate at the State and District Levels 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 offer a glimpse into statewide- and district level safety performance. Table 4.1 provides mean 
scores for each category at the state level. The range in scores is narrow (3.47 – 4.21), highlighting that respondents 
view KYTC’s safety performance as compliant to proactive across all categories. Aligning and Integrating Safety and 
Improving Supervisory Leadership are the categories in which the agency garners its highest scores. Table 4.2 lists 
the mean safety climate score for each district. These scores were calculated by averaging the scores of the eight 
categories. Scores are presented in descending order. Note also that letters used to label districts do not correspond 
to actual district numbers. The range of these scores shows good agreement with statewide data as mean scores fall 
between 3.47 and 4.22. Again, this indicates that district safety performance typically falls between compliant and 
proactive in the eyes of survey respondents. 
 
Table 4.1 Statewide Mean Scores for Safety Climate Categories 
Category Mean Category Score 
Aligning and Integrating Safety 4.21 
Improving Supervisory Leadership 4.02 
Improving Communication 3.81 
Demonstrating Management Commitment 3.69 
Empowering and Involving Employees 3.57 
Training at All Levels 3.53 
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Table 4.2 Mean Safety Climate Scores By District 













* Scores are sorted in descending order. District labels do not correspond to district numbers. 
 
We compared the mean climate safety score for each district to the Total Recordable Incident Rate (TRIR) — a 
traditional safety measure used by KYTC. One important caveat when looking at these comparisons is that the 
climate safety scores and TRIR use different scales. A perfect TRIR score is 0 and a perfect score for safety climate is 
5. Nonetheless correlation analysis is useful for uncovering a potential relationship between the two. Probost et al. 
(2019) found a negative correlation between safety climate scores and TRIR, however, we did not detect this in our 
data. Instead, there was a small, non-significant positive correlation (r = 0.095, p = 0.76). The random scatter of data 
suggests the lack of a pronounced relationship. Interestingly, the district with the lowest TRIR had the lowest safety 
climate score. However, given the lack of a generalizable relationships or trends, we would strongly caution against 
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Chapter 5 Safety Culture Assessment Focus Groups 
 
Based on responses to the safety climate survey we selected two districts to participate in safety culture assessment 
focus groups. We used Johnson’s (1992) Cultural Web Assessment Toolkit as a framework to structure focus group 
discussions. This tool can be used to investigate eight elements of employee perceptions of organizational culture. 
Focus group interviews adopted a semi-structured format, with the questions in Table 5.1 providing a starting point 
for discussions. Findings are presented for each element.  
 
Table 5.1 Organizational Life Elements and Example Questions 
Elements of Organizational Life Example Questions 
1. Safety Controls 
• What does your organization measure, monitor and reinforce related to 
safety? 
• Do employees get rewarded for working safely or penalized for poor 
safety? 
2. Routines 
• How do people routinely behave towards each other about safety? 
• What routinely occurs concerning safety management/oversight? 
• Do the safety communication and the priority it is given reflect each 
other? 
3. Rituals 
• How does your organization reinforce safe behavior? 
• How well do we recognize safe behavior? 
• Do behaviors change based on how safety is recognized? 
4. Stories 
• What safety stories do people currently tell or do you hear about our 
department? 
• What do you talk about when you think of the safety of the department? 
• What messages are transmitted to new employees about safety? 
5. Symbols  
• What symbols are used to communicate the importance of safety to 
employees? 
• What symbols, actions, or discussions keep you focused on safety daily? 
• What kind of reminders would you like to see to remind you to work 
safely? 
6. Power 
• What beliefs about safety are held by the organization’s leadership? 
• How does this translate into practice? 
• Do you feel you have the ability to make changes in safety and how we 
practice it? 
7. Safety Structures • What formal and informal safety mechanisms are in place? • Do you feel encouraged to report safety incidents? 
8. Underlying Assumptions • Summary description of your department’s actual safety philosophy? 
 
5.1 Safety Controls 
These are safety-related items that are measured, monitored, or reinforced (e.g.,  number of near-miss reports 
completed, number of risk assessments completed, number of job hazard analyses [JHAs] completed). Safety 
controls communicated by maintenance superintendents are primarily related to incident investigations and the 
recording and monitoring injuries. Many controls are compliance-based (i.e., OSHA requirements). Documentation 
of near misses is being piloted. JHAs are used in both districts, however, frequency of use varies. Staff in both districts 
noted that a reward system was previously in place to recognize crews for positive safety performances; this involved 
buying personnel a meal. However, that program no longer exists and no incentives are available to reward safe 
work. Performance evaluations factor in safety actions but the manner in which they are currently structured does 
not provide a significant incentive. 
 
5.2 Routines 
Routines are safety-related practices that are engaged in regularly. Examples include weekly safety meetings that 
everyone attends and daily huddle meetings at which crews and superintendents gather to discuss safety before the 
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day’s work begins. Routines described by superintendents are JHAs, which are completed for every task, and toolbox 
talks or job briefings — these are required twice per month but are regularly done every day. Job briefings cover 
topics such as traffic control, necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), and anticipated hazards for the 
upcoming day. Staff in both districts observed that safety committees meet regularly to discuss safety. Committees 
consist of a maintenance supervisor, someone from the highway technician (HT) series, an engineer, and an 
administrative person. Positions rotate annually. In one district, the safety committee meets once per quarter; in 
the other, every six weeks. 
 
5.3 Rituals 
Unlike routines, rituals do not occur at fixed time intervals, but rather as certain events occur. An example of a ritual 
is a mandatory safety orientation training for all new hires. The focus groups mentioned few rituals. There is an 
onboarding safety training for all employees conducted at the beginning and middle of the month. Training is 
provided by district safety coordinators. Other courses maintenance workers attend during the first year of 
employment include the OSHA 10 Hour training as well as classes on first aid, CPR, and flagging. Flagging training is 
a high priority because of demand. HTs receive additional training within the first year of employment. Other than 
training, monthly communications are sent out via email discussing safety — these take the form of a safety talk or 
advisory notice.  
 
5.4 Stories 
Stories are powerful ways to communicate information. Safety stories are especially important to reinforce the idea 
that accidents can happen and that outcomes are unique to the storyteller. Stories are regularly told throughout 
organizations because of the specific, unique, and memorable impact they convey. Safety stories can focus on topics 
such as accidents or instances of employees being recognized for working safely. 
 
Maintenance staff in both districts shared a number of unique stories. Of all the elements of a safety culture captured 
in the focus groups, stories were the most powerful and frequently used mode of communicating the immediacy 
and importance of safety. One story involved new, inexperienced staff working in ice storms. Before going into the 
field, superintendents shared previous experiences on the frailty of trees and dangers of ice-coated electrical lines. 
Within the first 30 minutes of work, new hires went to their superintendent and noted how accurate and helpful the 
stories were. A few stories related to tree felling and kickbacks that caused serious injuries. They provided 
opportunities to discuss awareness, PPE, and proper tree felling techniques. Most stories involved work zone 
accidents. Occupational/personnel safety is the primary focus of any organization’s safety culture, however, work 
zone accidents strike a chord with maintenance crews. Frustration was evident over the lack of awareness and lack 
of precautions taken by motorists in work zones. Perhaps this is due to the severity of incidents, the unpredictability 
of drivers, or that they have more control and thus responsibility for occupational accidents. Several examples of 
flagger fatalities or significant and permanent injuries were noted.  
 
5.5 Symbols 
Symbols are tangible or intangible representations that demonstrate the importance and value of safety in an 
organization. Examples include a monthly award for the safest crew and documenting good-catch stories in a safety 
newsletter. Focus group participants could not cite safety symbols within KYTC. They did, however, suggest the need 
for more and better communications with drivers approaching work zones. One suggestion was using road signage 
and navigation systems to alert drivers of upcoming work zones. Others commented on the need for hazardous duty 
pay, because the number of incidents and hazards, and for additional training in high school and driver’s education 
classes on navigating work zones. 
 
5.6 Power 
This refers to how empowered staff feel to perform their jobs safely. Organizations that encourage employees to 
halt work when it is unsafe are considered high-power cultures. District staff noted that maintenance crews are told 
they have the authority to stop work if they encounter safety issues. No instances of an employee’s safety concerns 
being ignored were given. Each crew has a leader that should be alerted if conditions are unsafe. They are 
responsible for communicating a stop-work message. Staff in one district noted that they had crews on a trenching 
 
KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 38 
job where KYTC employees felt it was unsafe, so they discontinued work. A contractor was onsite as well, however, 
they did not feel as if conditions were unsafe. One of the contractor’s employees entered the unsafe trench, resulting 
in a fatality. 
 
5.7 Safety Structures 
Safety structures are formal or informal administrative systems that protect workers from hazards. Examples include 
requirements to obtain a hot work permit for welding or acquiring a confined space permit if respiratory issues may 
be a concern. At KYTC these permits are not used. If work must be done in a confined space, a District 5 crew is called 
for support. Only minor spot welding occurs in equipment maintenance facilities. If digging is required, districts call 
811 for utility checks. The 811 teams are generally responsive to KYTC needs and often get a crew out within an 
hour. 
 
5.8 Underlying Assumptions 
Although underlying assumptions are difficult to capture, they are critical because they often drive decision-making 
behaviors within an organization. We asked focus group members to briefly describe KYTC’s actual safety philosophy. 
Unedited responses are provided below.  
 
• The most important thing is that we all go home safely at the end of the day. 
• Our friends and families live here and travel the highways just like everyone else, so let’s keep it as safe as 
possible whether it's summer or wintertime. 
• Getting home safely to our families 
• Have been here 16 years and have seen so much work driving safety in this administration. It’s the best I’ve 
seen. We have a long way to go, but it’s the best I’ve seen. Every staff meeting starts with safety. We have to 
get the work done but not at the expense of someone getting hurt. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion and Recommendations  
 
Safety climate and culture significantly influence an organization’s safety outcomes. Organizational culture drives 
behaviors, and those behaviors in turn sustain culture. If a strong and positive safety culture exists, it nurtures strong 
and positive safety behaviors. Strong and positive safety behaviors then reinforce and sustain that culture. A weak 
and negative culture produces weak and negative safety behaviors. Compounding that, a culture is fluid, not static. 
Awareness of an organization’s climate and culture is thus critical. However, measuring climate and culture can be 
difficult as its themes and elements are subjective and abstract. Despite challenges, measurement is a worthwhile 
endeavor. For this study, we used an adapted version of S-CAT to measure KYTC’s safety climate and then held focus 
groups with maintenance superintendents to further document safety culture using the Cultural Web Assessment 
Toolkit (Johnson 1992).  
 
Based on surveys of maintenance crews, the overall safety climate score of KYTC is 3.71. Qualitatively, the Cabinet’s 
safety climate can be characterized as compliant and transitioning toward proactive. Anecdotally, this aligns with 
efforts from KYTC’s Office of Safety. Historically, it has sought compliance as the goal. But a few years ago Cabinet 
leadership recognized the moral imperative and value of achieving excellence in safety and dedicated effort and 
resources to bolster employee safety. The safety climate reflects these efforts, as it is moving in a more proactive 
direction. Changes in climate and culture do not happen swiftly or easily, but through constant dedication, attention, 
and effort by all employees. Promisingly, a couple elements of safety climate already qualify as proactive — Aligning 
and Integrating Safety as a Value and Improving Supervisory Leadership. This means that maintenance 
superintendents believe safety is valued at KYTC and that it is communicated through supervisors. Two categories 
— Employee Risk Perception and Accountability at All Levels — had lower scores, suggesting that  improvements can 
be made to enhance risk perception skills and build robust accountability structures. When looking at demographic 
drivers of the safety climate score, level of training and frequency of experiencing a previous incident play significant 
roles. As employees receive safety training, they tend to assign lower ratings to the safety climate. In addition, the 
more safety-related incidents an employee has been directly involved in, the lower the safety climate scores 
reported. Notably, years of experience did not have an impact on scores.  
 
Focus group assessments revealed similar findings. Although there are encouraging signs that KYTC’s safety culture 
is getting better, some gaps need to be filled. Focus groups suggested there are few safety controls, inconsistently 
practiced routines, no symbols, and few structures. Nonetheless, participants felt that safety is strongly valued at 
KYTC, is as important as ever, and is expected of all employees in their job performance. This speaks to a safety 
culture that is positive and in the process of becoming stronger. Additional levels of controls, symbols, structures, 
and routines can help address gaps in the overall safety performance of KYTC. Reason’s (1990) Swiss Cheese Model 
visualizes this need (Figure 6.1). 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Swiss Cheese Model Adapted from Reason  
  
 
Each slice of swiss cheese represents a layer of defense against a hazard (e.g., management, controls, physical 
environments, employee behaviors). But each slice is dotted with holes — management can be deficient, controls 
 
KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 40 
may be inadequate, the physical environment may have failures, and people may act unsafely. Even though one slice 
may have a gap, multiple layers of defense can help prevent a hazard before an accident occurs. But when all the 
gaps align an accident occurs. As KYTC continues its pursuit of a more proactive and exemplary safety program it will 
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Appendix A KYTC Safety Climate Survey 
 
KYTC Safety Climate Survey   
This anonymous and confidential survey is intended to capture your perception on the value of safety within your 
role and within the organization of KYTC. Your answers will be completely anonymous and will not be linked to you 
personally. To the degree identifiable questions are asked, they are strictly intended to understand information 
about where these perceptions originate generally.  Your answers will directly go to researchers at the Kentucky 
Transportation Center at the University of Kentucky and no one from KYTC will be able to see them. When results 
are presented, they will be aggregated and anonymous, so that we, again, protect your confidentiality. 
  
Please complete and submit this survey as soon as possible. We estimate that it should take no more than 20 minutes 
to complete. If you have any questions or problems with operation or access to the survey, please contact the project 
lead, Gabe Dadi, at (859) 257-5416 or at gabe.dadi@uky.edu.   
  
Thank you for your time and expertise in completing this survey. This will help us advise KYTC on how safety is 




Q4 What district do you currently work in? 
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Q7 What safety training programs have you completed before? (Check all that apply). 
▢ OSHA 10 Hour  (1)  
▢ OSHA 30 Hour  (2)  
▢ Work Zone Traffic Control (WZTC)  (3)  
▢ Leadership Training  (4)  
▢ Other  (5) ________________________________________________ 
▢ Other  (6) ________________________________________________ 




Q8 How often have you been directly involved in a work-related (non-traffic) accident while working in highway 
maintenance (not necessarily just with KYTC)? 
o Never  (1)  
o Once  (2)  
o 2-3 times  (3)  
o 4-5 times  (4)  
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Q9 In highway maintenance work, there is a high probability that workers are going to be involved in a work-
related accident. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  




Q10 At work, we take the risk of getting hurt in order to get the job done. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  




Q11 In our work, productivity is more important and valued than safety. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  
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Q12 In our work, the probability of being involved in a traffic accident is higher than the probability of being 
involved in a work-related accident.  
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  




Q13 In our work, we are more concerned about traffic-related accidents than work-related accidents. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  




Q14 In highway maintenance work, the risk of getting hurt is part of the job.  
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  
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Q15 In our work, we take safety shortcuts when necessary. 
o Strongly disagree  (1)  
o Disagree  (2)  
o Neutral  (3)  
o Agree  (4)  
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Q17 Demonstrating Management Commitment (Management refers to District Management and/or Safety 
Supervisor) 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 




Q18 In KYTC, management... 
o Rarely comes to the actual jobsite  (1)  
o Only comes to the job site after an incident has occurred.  (2)  
o Only comes to the job site when required or makes infrequent visits  (3)  
o Makes regular visits to the job site. Interacts mostly with management.  (4)  
o Frequently visits the job site; seeks out interactions with employees.  (5)  




Q19 When management is present on the job site, they...  
o Typically act as poor safety role models by breaking safety policies and procedures.  (1)  
o Are only concerned with adhering to OSHA regulations and organizational policies and procedures after 
an employee injury has occurred.  (2)  
o Strictly conform to required OSHA regulations and organizational safety policies and procedures, never 
more or less.  (3)  
o Demonstrate safety behaviors above and beyond what is required.  (4)  
o Consistently model safety behaviors above and beyond what is required and recognize employees who do 
the same  (5)  
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Q20 In KYTC, management... 
o Does not participate in safety audits.  (1)  
o Only participates in safety audits in response to an employee injury or adverse safety event.  (2)  
o Participates in safety audits only when required.  (3)  
o Initiates and actively participates in internal safety audits.  (4)  
o Actively participates in internal safety audits and uses the information for management performance 
evaluation.  (5)  




Q21 In KYTC, management... 
o Does not want to know about any safety incident, unless it's a fatality. There are no investigations into 
incidents or close calls.  (1)  
o Resists taking steps to correct or prevent future incidents. Investigations into incidents or close calls result 
in disciplinary action toward employees.  (2)  
o Investigates incident but not in a "blame-free" manner. Initiates corrective actions.  (3)  
o Includes employees in both a root cause analysis and helping to come up with solutions to prevent future 
incidents and foster continued improvements.  (4)  
o Relies on a formalized process for conducting a detailed root cause analysis that reviews both processes 
and behaviors. Findings are discussed with everyone and preventive solutions are implemented.  (5)  





KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 51 
Q22 When employees are injured, management... 
o Immediately blames and punishes the employee (e.g., fired)  (1)  
o Typically blames employees for injuries, threatening them with suspension or even termination.  (2)  
o Only holds employees accountable for injuries according to organizational guidelines.  (3)  
o Provides appropriate support for the injured employees.  (4)  
o Provides support to injured employees, facilitate return to work, and seeks to learn from employee 
injuries.  (5)  




Q23 In KYTC... 
o There is no formal safety management system; safety trends are not analyzed.  (1)  
o The safety management system is reviewed and safety trends are only analyzed in response to employee 
injury or an adverse event.  (2)  
o The safety management system is reviewed and safety trends are analyzed from time to time.  (3)  
o The safety management system is reviewed and safety trends are analyzed annually to ensure 
effectiveness and relevance.  (4)  
o The safety management system is reviewed and safety trends are analyzed bi-annually to ensure 
effectiveness and relevance.  (5)  
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Q24 Aligning and Integrating Safety as a Value 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 




Q25 In KYTC, most believe... 
o Our work is inherently dangerous, and nothing can be done to change it.  (1)  
o Safety is costly and a burden; a necessary evil.  (2)  
o Safety is only important because it is an OSHA requirement.  (3)  
o Safety is very important to employees and management alike.  (4)  
o Safety is a value of utmost importance and placed before all else.  (5)  




Q26 In KYTC, safety is discussed... 
o Never.  (1)  
o Only when accidents occurred.  (2)  
o Only when required.  (3)  
o At the end of most of our meetings.  (4)  
o At the beginning of every meeting because it is a top priority.  (5)  
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Q27 In KYTC... 
o The primary focus is on productivity and reducing costs. Employees are rewarded for taking shortcuts to 
meet production goals.  (1)  
o When work falls behind schedule, production becomes valued more than safety.  (2)  
o As long as minimum safety requirements are being met, production and cost reduction are the main 
priorities in our work.  (3)  
o For the most part, safety is not compromised for the sake of productivity. Work is completed as safely as 
possible.  (4)  
o Safety is never compromised for productivity, schedule, or cost. Safety truly comes first.  (5)  




Q28 In KYTC... 
o Safety is not integrated within organizational policies and procedures.  (1)  
o Safety is not valued or enforced when management, OSHA, or safety professionals are not present.  (2)  
o Safety is only integrated to the point of meeting minimum OSHA requirements.  (3)  
o Safety language is formally integrated into most policies and procedures.  (4)  
o Safety is formally and informally integrates into all policies and procedures.  (5)  
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Q29 In KYTC... 
o There is no focus on proactive or reactive safety measures.  (1)  
o Safety measures are only examined in response to accidents.  (2)  
o Safety measures focus solely on reactive measures (e.g. injury rate, EMR).  (3)  
o Occasional attempts are made to measure and use proactive measures to improve job site safety climate.  
(4)  
o Proactive measures are regularly assessed and acted upon (i.e. changes made) to improve the job site 
safety climate.  (5)  




Q30 In KYTC, management... 
o Does not invest in safety program development or provide adequate resources to conduct work safely.  
(1)  
o Only invests in safety program development and provides minimal resources to safety activities after an 
accident has occurred.  (2)  
o Participates in safety program development and allocates resources to the extent that it is required by 
regulatory authorities (e.g. OSHA).  (3)  
o Provides adequate resources to ensure a safe working environment. Develops a safety program that is 
shared with all employees.  (4)  
o Provides ongoing financial support for ongoing development of safety policies, programs, and processes. 
Invests in systems to continually improve the job site safety climate.  (5)  
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Q31 Ensuring Accountability at All Levels 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 




Q32 In KYTC... 
o Employee safety performance is not evaluated at all. If they mess up, they are fired.  (1)  
o Employees are punished for not practicing safe behaviors, but they are not rewarded for proactively 
identifying hazards.  (2)  
o Safety metrics for employee performance evaluation are given lip service and sometimes informally used 
to evaluate employee performance.  (3)  
o Safety metrics are formally integrated into employee performance appraisal processes to evaluate and 
reward employees for maintaining and improving a positive job site safety climate.  (4)  
o Safety metrics are formally integrated into employee performance appraisal processes to evaluate and 
reward employees for maintaining and improving a positive job site safety climate. Data are used to identify 
targeted training opportunities.  (5)  




Q33 In KYTC... 
o There are no safety-related metrics included in managers' or supervisors' performance evaluations.  (1)  
o The only safety metric used in managers' and supervisors' evaluations is the number of employee injuries, 
and often that is ignored.  (2)  
o Managers and supervisors are held accountable for meeting the minimum required safety standards but 
poor safety performance carries few real consequences.  (3)  
o Managers and supervisors are primarily held accountable for reactive safety measures (e.g. recordable 
injury rate), but some proactive measures (e.g. safety climate metrics) have been included.  (4)  
o Managers and supervisors are held accountable for proactive (e.g. safety climate metrics) and reactive 
safety measures. Proactive safety leadership is a critical component of their evaluation and promotion.  (5)  
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Q34 In KYTC, safety expectations, roles, and responsibilities... 
o Are not identified nor articulated to individuals working at the job site.  (1)  
o Are only clarified after an accident.  (2)  
o Are only set to meet OSHA requirements.  (3)  
o Are frequently, clearly, and consistently communicated to employees.  (4)  
o Are discussed with employees across the entire Cabinet; they are reinforced on a daily basis.  (5)  




Q35 In KYTC... 
o There is no safety incentive structure.  (1)  
o Employees are informed that an event may impact whether or not they will receive a safety reward.  (2)  
o Employees are told to work safely, and safety rewards are based on not getting hurt.  (3)  
o Employees are recognized and rewarded for identifying hazards, reporting near misses and close calls, 
creating safety solutions, and for superior safety performance.  (4)  
o Safety metrics (based on proactive and reactive measures) are benchmarked against other organizations 
and used for internal continuous improvement. Everyone is recognized and rewarded for safety performance.  
(5)  
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Q36 Improving Supervisory Leadership (Supervisor refers to your direct supervisor) 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 




Q37 In KYTC... 
o Supervisors don't have a safety-related vision to share with their crew. Their commitment is primarily to 
production.  (1)  
o Supervisors don't have a safety-related vision. When an accident occurs, they tell employees they must 
work safely.  (2)  
o Supervisory safety vision consists only of meeting regulatory requirements and avoiding accidents.  (3)  
o Supervisors talk with their crew about their vision for creating a strong, positive work safety climate. They 
display that commitment by "walking the talk."  (4)  
o Supervisors share with their crew their vision for, and display a deep commitment to, creating a strong, 
positive work safety climate. They inspire and motivate employees to share that same commitment.  (5)  




Q38 In KYTC... 
o Supervisors have no supervisory training and have little understanding or knowledge of regulatory 
requirements.  (1)  
o After an incident occurs or some regulatory action is taken, there is talk among higher level management 
about the importance of supervisory leadership.  (2)  
o Supervisors take OSHA 30-hour training and thus are familiar with OSHA regulations, but they have little 
or no leadership training.  (3)  
o Supervisors are trained not only on regulatory guidelines but have a minimal level of leadership training.  
(4)  
o Supervisors are provided with and required to take leadership training that includes topics such as: how 
to communicate with and motivate team members; how to conduct pre-planning meetings; and how to 
inspire crew members to also be safety leaders.  (5)  




KTC Research Report Evaluating the Safety Cultures of KYTC Maintenance Crews 58 
 
Q39 In KYTC, supervisors... 
o Manage and punish using intimidation, and focus only on individual behavior without taking what may 
have been a faulty process into account.  (1)  
o Start caring for their crew and acting as safety leaders only after an incident occurs or regulatory action is 
taken. The behavior displayed is short-lived.  (2)  
o "Talk the safety talk" but often do not follow their own advice and expectations.  (3)  
o Initiate and actively participate in safety program activities that are focused on continuous improvement.  
(4)  
o Instill a sense of safety ownership at all levels. Serve as effective safety communicators, excellent role 
models for safety and are able to coach and teach. Infuse safety into every meeting.  (5)  
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Q40 Empowering and Involving Employees 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 




Q41 In KYTC... 
o Employees feel no sense of responsibility for their co-employees' or their own safety.  (1)  
o Employees aren't engaged in promoting safety until after an accident occurs.  (2)  
o Employees are engaged in promoting safety to the extent that is required.  (3)  
o Employees participate in all aspects of ensuring a safe job site, beginning at the planning and design 
stages.  (4)  
o Employees are empowered and rewarded for going above and beyond to ensure a safe job site. 
Employees always feel responsible for their and their co-employees' safety.  (5)  




Q42 In KYTC... 
o Employee feedback regarding safety conditions and hazard reduction is not sought. They just want 
employees to "get the job done."  (1)  
o Employees are asked for safety advice and feedback after an injury or adverse safety event has occurred.  
(2)  
o Employee feedback regarding safety is sought only when initiated by employees or during mandatory 
safety meetings.  (3)  
o Management actively involves employees in identifying hazards and solving safety problems by including 
them in daily pre-job safety and crew task/hazard analysis.  (4)  
o Management actively seeks employee input on safety. Safety and even non-safety meetings and walk-
arounds focus on solving specific problems identified by employees and others.  (5)  
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Q43 In KYTC... 
o There are no safety committees.  (1)  
o Safety committees are created only after an incident occurs and do not remain active very long.  (2)  
o Standing safety committees may exist but they don't carry much weight; meetings may last only a few 
minutes.  (3)  
o There is an active management-employee safety committee that provides suggestions and makes 
recommendations.  (4)  
o The management-employee safety committee actively seeks suggestions from all employees on the job 
site and ensures that recommendations are seen through to completion.  (5)  
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Q45 Improving Communication 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 




Q46 In KYTC... 
o Management isn't interested in and therefore doesn't involve employees in safety discussions. No system 
exists for employees to voice concerns directly to management. Supervisors don't share crews' concerns with 
management.  (1)  
o Employees feel comfortable voicing concerns to a supervisor, but not directly to management. 
Management passes safety messages down to employees only when there is an incident, injury, or negative 
event.  (2)  
o Employees with concerns that involve a direct OSHA violation can raise the issue with their supervisor. 
Management shares safety information with supervisors and employees to the extent it is required (e.g. 
posting OSHA placards).  (3)  
o Safety communication is a two-way street. Employees are encouraged to raise safety concerns at any time 
to supervisors or to management.  (4)  
o Employees are continually encouraged and rewarded for raising safety concerns and suggesting 
improvements. Concerns are promptly addressed and resulting changes are communicated back to 
employees.  (5)  
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Q47 In KYTC... 
o Injury and illness data are not collected unless there's a fatality that must be reported to OSHA and other 
entities.  (1)  
o Injury and illness data are collected, but they are only reviewed after an accident has occurred. Issues are 
not formally tracked nor are resolutions communicated across the organization.  (2)  
o Injury and illness data are collected for the purpose of being compliant with OSHA requirements. 
Supervisors pass safety information onto their crew only when required by management.  (3)  
o Injury/incident data are regularly and formally collected and shared with managers and supervisors; 
supervisors are encouraged but not required to share information with their employees  (4)  
o There are formal systems for gathering injury/incident data and for regularly sharing the information and 
follow-up improvement actions with managers, supervisors, and employees.  (5)  




Q48 In KYTC... 
o There are no safety-related communication efforts.  (1)  
o Safety-related communication efforts occur only in response to an accident. And even that doesn't always 
happen.  (2)  
o Safety-related communication efforts meet OSHA requirements.  (3)  
o Safety-related communication efforts are made when there's a new standard or policy that needs to be 
followed.  (4)  
o Safety-related communication efforts are formalized both vertically and horizontally throughout the 
Cabinet and on job sites.  (5)  
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Q49 Training at All Levels 
For each item below, carefully read the descriptions in each box going from left to right. Select the one that best 





o Does not provide formal safety training. Assumes employees are trained properly when they come on-
site.  (1)  
o Only provides formal safety training in response to accidents; commitment to training diminishes over 
time.  (2)  
o Only provides formal safety training as often as required by OSHA. Majority of training is provided via 
toolbox talks.  (3)  
o Provides frequent formal safety training for employees, supervisors, and managers.  (4)  
o Ongoing safety training is viewed as being critical for continuous improvement. Provides frequent formal 
safety training to all employees.  (5)  




Q51 In KYTC... 
o No certification is required for employees or supervisors.  (1)  
o Employees and supervisors can voluntarily pursue the OSHA 10-hour certificate.  (2)  
o Employees and supervisors are required to have only the OSHA 10-hour certificate.  (3)  
o Employees are required to obtain the OSHA 10-hour certificate. Supervisors are required to obtain the 
OSHA 30-hour certificate.  (4)  
o In addition to the OSHA 30-hour certificate, supervisors are strongly encouraged and provided with 
resources to obtain other certifications (e.g. Safety Trained Supervisor (STS)).  (5)  
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Q52 In KYTC... 
o Training, if implemented at all, is very general.  (1)  
o The training that exists is aimed exclusively at individual employee behavior and is developed in response 
to an accident.  (2)  
o An off-the-shelf curriculum is used to meet OSHA and management system training requirements.  (3)  
o Supervisors and managers get training on safety leadership skills, as well as OSHA standards.  (4)  
o Supervisor-led training as well as peer training is implemented. Training has a heavy emphasis on 
leadership skills.  (5)  




Q53 In KYTC... 
o Neither training nor training needs assessments are conducted.  (1)  
o Training needs assessments focus on recent accidents only (e.g. a ladder injury will result in training on 
ladder safety).  (2)  
o Training needs are based on OSHA standards.  (3)  
o Training needs are typically identified by supervisors but may also be initiated by employees.  (4)  
o Employees are integral to identifying training needs and developing materials.  (5)  
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Q54 In KYTC... 
o There is no training verification process. Fraudulent training cards may even be accepted.  (1)  
o Training cards or certificates are only investigated after an incident has occurred.  (2)  
o Training is verified only to the extent required by OSHA.  (3)  
o Training for all employees, including sub-contractors, is verified regularly.  (4)  
o Training for all employees, including all sub-contractors, is verified before work is conducted on every 
project. Knowledge and skill competence are regularly assessed.  (5)  




Q55 In KYTC... 
o Trainers have no formal qualifications.  (1)  
o Because of job site experience alone, senior level employees (e.g. superintendents) are asked to conduct 
safety training.  (2)  
o A formal safety curriculum is developed and administered by trainers who meet minimal OSHA 
qualifications.  (3)  
o Safety curriculum is developed by highly qualified trainers.  (4)  
o Safety curriculum is developed and administered by highly qualified and experienced content experts with 
knowledge of adult learning principles.  (5)  
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